Arbeitspapier

Pareto-improving unemployment policies

We investigate how continental European unemployment can be reduced without reducing unemployment benefits and without reducing the net income of low-wage earners. Lower unemployment replacement rates reduce unemployment, the net wage and unemployment benefits. A lower tax on labour increases net wages and - for certain benefit-systems - unemployment benefits as well. Combining these two policies allows to reduce unemployment in countries with “net-Bismarck” and Beveridge systems without reducing net income of workers or of the unemployed. Such a policy becomes self-financing under realistic parameter constellations when taxes are reduced only for low-income workers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1807

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
Thema
Arbeitslosigkeit
Beschäftigungspolitik
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lingens, Jörg
Wälde, Klaus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lingens, Jörg
  • Wälde, Klaus
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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