Arbeitspapier
Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes
An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types a third type of agents is introduced: These 'conformists' have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do too. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the 'social norm'), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy the principal may signal trust in a favorable social norm.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2293
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Anreizvertrag
Soziale Norm
Vertrauen
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Agency Theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sliwka, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2006
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