Signaling and tacit collusion in an in…finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Arbeitspapier

In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners.Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types - and this is common knowledge - then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they'll cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 587

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Cooperation ; Tacit Collusion

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Harrington, Joseph E. ; Zhao, Wei
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Baltimore, MD
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101353
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ