Arbeitspapier

Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in a region delays chains' entry into franchising by 0.28 years on average, 9 percent of the average waiting time, and slows their growth by around 10 percent, leading to a 10 percent reduction in franchised chain employment.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4474

Classification
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Industry Studies: Services: General
Subject
contracting
incentives
principal-agent
empirical
collateralizable housing wealth
entry
growth

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fan, Ying
Kühn, Kai-Uwe
Lafontaine, Francine
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fan, Ying
  • Kühn, Kai-Uwe
  • Lafontaine, Francine
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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