Arbeitspapier

Mobile Termination with Asymmetric Networks

This paper examines mobile termination fees and their regulation when networks are asymmetric in size. It is demonstrated that with consumer ignorance about the exact termination rates (a) a mobile network's termination rate is the higher the smaller the network's size (as measured through its subscriber base) and (b) asymmetric regulation of only the larger operators in a market will, ce-teris paribus, induce the smaller operators to increase their termination rates. The results are supported by empirical evidence using data on mobile termination rates from 48 European mobile operators from 2001 to 2003.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Diskussionspapier ; No. 23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Telecommunications
Economics of Regulation
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
mobile termination
telecommunications
consumer ignorance
price regulation
Mobilkommunikation
Vertrag
Telekommunikationsgebühr
Telekommunikationspolitik
Staatliche Preispolitik
Konsumentenverhalten
Theorie
EU-Staaten
Vertragsbeendigung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dewenter, Ralf
Haucap, Justus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
(wo)
Hamburg
(wann)
2003

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-1605
Letzte Aktualisierung
12.07.2024, 13:21 MESZ

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dewenter, Ralf
  • Haucap, Justus
  • Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre

Entstanden

  • 2003

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