Arbeitspapier
Bonus versus penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing?
We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus / avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts. We discuss possible reasons for this null result.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2016-01
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- Thema
-
contract framing
bonus
penalty
fine
loss aversion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
de Quidt, Jonathan
Fallucchi, Francesco
Kölle, Felix
Nosenzo, Daniele
Quercia, Simone
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
- (wo)
-
Nottingham
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- de Quidt, Jonathan
- Fallucchi, Francesco
- Kölle, Felix
- Nosenzo, Daniele
- Quercia, Simone
- The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
Entstanden
- 2016
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