Artikel
Nachhaltigkeitsziele und das Lieferkettengesetz
This article discusses whether supply chain due diligence laws are a suitable instrument for goals of sustainability. It uses the German due diligence law as an example and makes recommendations for the design of European rules. The emerging evidence on the effect of trade policies in global value chains suggests that, in response to such laws, firms may reorganise their supply chains away from countries that commit human rights violations. The German law, by contrast, wants firms to "Stay and Behave", i. e. to work to improve human rights. The article discusses measures that give a "Stay and Behave" outcome its best chance.
- Weitere Titel
-
Sustainability goals and supply chain due diligence laws
- Sprache
-
Deutsch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Wirtschaftsdienst ; ISSN: 1613-978X ; Volume: 102 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 5 ; Pages: 344-346 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Springer
- (wo)
-
Heidelberg
- (wann)
-
2022
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s10273-022-3186-4
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Springer
Entstanden
- 2022
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