- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Umfang
-
133 Bl.
- Maße
-
30 cm
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 2003 (Nicht für den Austausch)
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Schlagwort
-
Anreiz
Kontrakttheorie
Politiker
Wahl
Spieltheorie
Wahl ; Politiker ; Wahlkampf ; Vertrag
- Urheber
-
Liessem, Verena
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.03.2025, 11:54 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Liessem, Verena
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