Arbeitspapier

Effective environmental protection in the context of government decentralization

China has shifted control over resources and decision making to local governments and enterprises as the result of the economic reforms over the past three decades. This devolution of decision-making to local levels and enterprises has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials and polluting enterprises who are more concerned with economic growth and profits than the environment. Therefore, effective environmental protection needs their full cooperation. Against this background, this paper discusses a variety of tactics that China's central government has been using to incentivize local governments, and a number of market-based instruments, supporting economic policies, environmental performance ratings and disclosure and cooperation with financial institutions to promote long-lasting, improved corporate energy-saving and environmental performance. It concludes that there is a clear need to carefully examine those objective and subjective factors that lead to the lack of local official's cooperation on the environment, and provides some suggestions for appropriated incentives to get their cooperation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 17.2011

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Energy and the Macroeconomy
Energy: Government Policy
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
Thema
Effective Environmental Protection
Incentive Structure
Economic Instruments
Industrial Policy
Financial Institutions
Government Decentralization
China

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Zhang, ZhongXiang
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Zhang, ZhongXiang
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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