Arbeitspapier
Buyer power and supplier incentives
This paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two chan-nels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently exam-ine the effects of buyer power on the supplier's incentives and on social welfare. Contrary to some informal claims in the policy debate on buyer power, we find that the exercise of buyer power - even though reducing supplier's profits- may often increase a supplier's incentive to undertake welfare enhancing activities.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-05
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- Thema
-
Buyer Power
Investments
Competition Policy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Inderst, Roman
Wey, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Inderst, Roman
- Wey, Christian
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2003
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