Arbeitspapier
On Hierarchies and Communication
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between these two types of relational structures is not always clear. In models of restricted cooperation this distinction should be defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-056/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
-
communication
hierarchy
cooperative game
feasible set
Hierarchie
Soziale Beziehungen
Transferable Utility Games
Kooperatives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van den Brink, René
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van den Brink, René
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2006
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