Artikel

Advertisement-financed credit ratings

This paper investigates the incentives of a credit rating agency (CRA) to generate accurate ratings under an advertisement-based business model. To this end, we study a two-period endogenous reputation model in which a CRA can increase the precision of its ratings by exerting effort. The CRA receives a revenue not from rating fees, as is standard in the literature, but through online advertising. We show that the advertisement-based business model provides sufficient incentives for the CRA to improve the precision of signals at intermediate levels of reputation. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which truthful reporting is incentive compatible.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Economics and Finance ; ISSN: 1938-9744 ; Volume: 46 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 188-206 ; New York, NY: Springer US

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Credit rating agencies
Rating precision
Information acquisition
Advertisement
Reputation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun
Siemering, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer US
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.1007/s12197-021-09562-8
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun
  • Siemering, Christian
  • Springer US

Entstanden

  • 2021

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