Arbeitspapier

Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

This paper descrives some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurment policy analysis. It descrives the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1078

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rogerson, William P.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
1993

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rogerson, William P.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 1993

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