Arbeitspapier
Political polarization
Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts, and consistent with Bayesian rationality.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 655
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
polarization
voting
information
Verhaltensökonomik
Beschränkte Rationalität
Politische Kultur
Staatliche Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dixit, Avinash K.
Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dixit, Avinash K.
- Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2007
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Managerial Incentives and Market Integration
Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?
Price competition and convex costs
The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium
An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory
The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles
Internal Efficiency and External Conditions
Probabilistic Choice as a Result of Mistakes
Finding all minimal CURB sets
Efficiency, communication and honesty
A scent of lemon-seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
Managerial Incentives and Market Integration
Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?
Price competition and convex costs
The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium
An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory
The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles
Internal Efficiency and External Conditions
Probabilistic Choice as a Result of Mistakes
Finding all minimal CURB sets
Efficiency, communication and honesty
A scent of lemon-seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
Managerial Incentives and Market Integration
Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?
Price competition and convex costs
The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium
An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory
The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles
Internal Efficiency and External Conditions
Probabilistic Choice as a Result of Mistakes
Finding all minimal CURB sets
Efficiency, communication and honesty