Arbeitspapier

Tax-Competition with Involuntary Unemployment

In the present paper we extend the classical tax-competition framework of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) by modelling involuntary unemployment and by allowing for labour taxation as a second source of public funds. For a large class of production functions (including CES), it turns out that tax competition is characterized by underprovision of public goods, and by positive taxes on both labour and capital. We thus conclude that the results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski survive some important and substantial modifications of the framework, and are thus more general than recently suggested elsewhere.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3048

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Thema
tax competition
capital and labour taxation
involuntary unemployment
efficient bargains
Steuerwettbewerb
Kapitalertragsteuer
Lohnsteuer
Steuerwirkung
Unfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeit
Öffentliches Gut
Versorgung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Eichner, Thomas
Upmann, Thorsten
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Upmann, Thorsten
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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