Arbeitspapier
Tax-Competition with Involuntary Unemployment
In the present paper we extend the classical tax-competition framework of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) by modelling involuntary unemployment and by allowing for labour taxation as a second source of public funds. For a large class of production functions (including CES), it turns out that tax competition is characterized by underprovision of public goods, and by positive taxes on both labour and capital. We thus conclude that the results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski survive some important and substantial modifications of the framework, and are thus more general than recently suggested elsewhere.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3048
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- Thema
-
tax competition
capital and labour taxation
involuntary unemployment
efficient bargains
Steuerwettbewerb
Kapitalertragsteuer
Lohnsteuer
Steuerwirkung
Unfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeit
Öffentliches Gut
Versorgung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eichner, Thomas
Upmann, Thorsten
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eichner, Thomas
- Upmann, Thorsten
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010