Arbeitspapier

Fiscal rules and composition bias in OECD countries

Using a sample of OECD countries, this paper finds that while fiscal rules succeeded in reducing total government expenditures and budget deficits in the medium term, they significantly affected the composition of government expenditure: the ratio of social transfers to government consumption declined. In contrast, we do not find a stable effect of fiscal rules on public investment. It is shown that the compositional shift against social transfers is beyond 'from welfare to work' policies, which have been adopted by many OECD countries during the nineties. Our empirical examination reveals that the reduction of social transfers relative to government consumption did not occur in countries with strong legal protection to social rights.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3088

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Economics: General
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
Fiscal Policy
Thema
fiscal rules
government deficit
government expenditure
expenditures composition
Finanzpolitik
Regelgebundene Politik
Öffentliche Finanzkontrolle
Öffentliche Ausgaben
Öffentliche Sozialausgaben
Öffentliche Investition
Schätzung

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dahan, Momi
Strawczynski, Michel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dahan, Momi
  • Strawczynski, Michel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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