Arbeitspapier

Strategic inattention in product search

Online platforms provide search tools that help consumers to get betterfitting product offers. But this technology makes consumer search behavior also easily traceable for the platform and allows for real-time price discrimination. Consumers face a trade-off: Search intensely and receive better fits at potentially higher prices or restrict search behavior - be strategically inattentive - and receive a worse fit, but maybe a better deal. We study the strategic buyer-seller interaction in such a situation theoretically as well as experimentally. The search technology we use in the laboratory leads by construction to better-fitting products, but we indeed find that only sellers profit from the buyers' use of the offered search tools.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2017/21

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Thema
strategic inattention
price discrimination
information transmission
consumer choice
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hillenbrand, Adrian
Hippel, Svenja
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hillenbrand, Adrian
  • Hippel, Svenja
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2017

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