Arbeitspapier
Strategic Formation of Coalitions
Consider a society with a finite number of individuals. A coalition structure is a partition of the set of individuals. Each individual has personal preferences over the set of all coalition structures. We study the strategy proof core and von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN&M) solutions. A roommate problem is a problem in which each coalition in each coalition structure contains at most two members. We show that as long as the core is single-valued, the core is coalitionally strategy proof. Moreover the core mechanism is completely characterized by three properties: strategy proofness, Pareto optimality and individual rationality, in the domain with single-valued core. The single-valued core defines the largest domain one may obtain such a mechanism. We show in an example that the single-valued core is manipulable if coalition structures allow more than two members. Nevertheless we show that the single-valued vN&M solution is coalitionally stratey proof and it is individually rational and Pareto optimal. In fact the vN&M solution is the only mechanism with the three properties in the domain with single-valued vN&M solution.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
- Thema
-
the core
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ma, Jinpeng
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
New Brunswick, NJ
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ma, Jinpeng
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1998
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