EU Regional Policy: Vertical Fiscal Externalities and Matching Grants

Arbeitspapier

Although decision processes at the EU level are highly complex and often require unanimity, explicit side payments among member states are unknown. However, logrolling and redistributive policies are substitutes. This paper considers the EU regional policy as a substitute for explicit side payments and asks - from a normative and a positive point of view - why matching grants instead of unconditional grants are used although at first sight regional policy is a national and not a union-wide task. It argues that the EU system of own resources creates positive vertical fiscal externalities. Hence, matching grants are part of an efficient grant system and, in so far as bargaining in EU bodies is efficient, matching grants are the natural outcome.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1146

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
• Thema: European economics ; regional policy ; intergovernmental grants ; side payments ; vertical fiscal externalities

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fenge, Robert ; Wrede, Matthias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76514
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ