Arbeitspapier

First-order and second-order ambiguity aversion

Different models of uncertainty aversion imply strikingly different economic behavior. The key to understanding these differences lies in the dichotomy between first-order and second-order ambiguity aversion which I define here. My definition and its characterization are independent of specific representations of decisions under uncertainty. I show that with second-order ambiguity aversion a positive exposure to ambiguity is optimal if and only if there is a subjective belief such that the act´s expected outcome is positive. With first-order ambiguity aversion, zero exposure to ambiguity can be optimal. Examples in finance, insurance and contracting demonstrate the economic relevance of this dichotomy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2015/13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Thema
uncertainty aversion
ambiguity
smooth ambiguity aversion
sub-jective beliefs
kinked preferences

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lang, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lang, Matthias
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2015

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