Arbeitspapier

Evolution towards asymptotic efficiency, preliminary version

We show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni di Dipartimento ; No. 173

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Demichelis, Stefano
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)
(wo)
Pavia
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
12.07.2024, 13:21 MESZ

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Demichelis, Stefano
  • Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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