Artikel

Measuring voting power in convex policy spaces

Classical power index analysis considers the individual's ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either yes or no. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Economies ; ISSN: 2227-7099 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 45-77 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
power
single peaked preferences
convex policy space
group decision making
Shapley-Shubik index
Banzhaf index
nucleolus
simple games
multiple levels of approval

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kurz, Sascha
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2014

DOI
doi:10.3390/economies2010045
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kurz, Sascha
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2014

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