Artikel
Measuring voting power in convex policy spaces
Classical power index analysis considers the individual's ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either yes or no. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Economies ; ISSN: 2227-7099 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 45-77 ; Basel: MDPI
Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
power
single peaked preferences
convex policy space
group decision making
Shapley-Shubik index
Banzhaf index
nucleolus
simple games
multiple levels of approval
single peaked preferences
convex policy space
group decision making
Shapley-Shubik index
Banzhaf index
nucleolus
simple games
multiple levels of approval
Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kurz, Sascha
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/economies2010045
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Kurz, Sascha
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2014
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