Artikel
Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests: The case of telephony
Using the political-economic history of the development of telephony during the 1870s as a backdrop, this paper studies a two-player Tullock contest that includes both research effort (R&D) and legal effort (i.e., rent-seeking effort). The two types of efforts complement each other and positively influence the payoff of the contest. We assume that legal effort affects the prize value, increasing the winner's prospective rents, and research effort impacts the probability of winning the contest. The results of the model break new ground in showing that research effort is a function of legal effort, wherein research effort increases with rent-seeking effort. The model also shows the existence of a strategic equivalence between rent seeking and patent races.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 116-126 ; Basel: MDPI
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Telecommunications
patent-race games
simultaneous invention
telephony development
Mixon, Franklin G.
Caudill, Steven B.
Wineke, Samantha J.
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g5020116
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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12.07.2024, 13:22 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Faria, João Ricardo
- Mixon, Franklin G.
- Caudill, Steven B.
- Wineke, Samantha J.
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2014