- Sprache
-
Englisch
- ISBN
-
0931-6558
- Identifier
-
109742149X
- Reihe
-
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 519
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Bleile, Jörg
Universität Bielefeld
Center for Mathematical Economics
Universität Bielefeld
Center for Mathematical Economics
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:54 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
- Bleile, Jörg
- Universität Bielefeld
- Center for Mathematical Economics
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Limited attention in case-based belief formation
Cautious belief formation
American options with multiple priors in continuous time
Welfare improving discrimination based on cognitive limitations
Quality uncertainty with imperfect information acquisition
On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: characterization of continuation payoff processes
On the Puzzle of Diversification in Social Networks with Occupational Mismatch
Radner equilibria under ambiguous volatility
Convex vNM-Stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part V: all games have vNM-Stable sets
Convex vNM–Stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part III: A small economy - uniqueness and multiple solutions
Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games
Aggregation of Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preferences: Arrovian impossibility results
Limited attention in case-based belief formation
Cautious belief formation
American options with multiple priors in continuous time
Welfare improving discrimination based on cognitive limitations
Quality uncertainty with imperfect information acquisition
On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: characterization of continuation payoff processes
On the Puzzle of Diversification in Social Networks with Occupational Mismatch
Radner equilibria under ambiguous volatility
Convex vNM-Stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part V: all games have vNM-Stable sets
Convex vNM–Stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part III: A small economy - uniqueness and multiple solutions
Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games
Aggregation of Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preferences: Arrovian impossibility results
Limited attention in case-based belief formation
Cautious belief formation
American options with multiple priors in continuous time
Welfare improving discrimination based on cognitive limitations
Quality uncertainty with imperfect information acquisition
On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: characterization of continuation payoff processes
On the Puzzle of Diversification in Social Networks with Occupational Mismatch
Radner equilibria under ambiguous volatility
Convex vNM-Stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part V: all games have vNM-Stable sets
Convex vNM–Stable sets for a semi orthogonal game. Part III: A small economy - uniqueness and multiple solutions
Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games