Arbeitspapier
Voluntary Disclosure Programs for Tax Evaders
In this paper, we develop a model that can explain why governments may want to choose to offer a voluntary disclosure program that allows people who withheld taxes to turn themselves in without punishment. We find that such a leniency rule not only increases government revenue when it comes as a surprise, but even when taxpayers anticipate it.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-128/VII
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Tax Law
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
- Thema
-
Tax compliance
voluntary disclosure
guilt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmittdiel, Heiner
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmittdiel, Heiner
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2015
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