Arbeitspapier
Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 15881
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Organization of Production
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
- Thema
-
relational contracts
informal enforcement
legal enforcement
incentives
private information
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
MacLeod, W. Bentley
Malcomson, James
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- MacLeod, W. Bentley
- Malcomson, James
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2023
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