Arbeitspapier
Sequential markets, market power and arbitrage
We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using micro-data from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweightloss.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0135
Reguant, Mar
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ito, Koichiro
- Reguant, Mar
- Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
Entstanden
- 2015