Arbeitspapier
Non-compliance with temporary agency work regulations: Initial evidence from Germany
Temporary agency work and outsourcing to a service contractor are two forms of alternative work arrangements with rather complex legal aspects which firms use for external staffing. The regulatory complexity of temporary agency work can lead to intended or unintended non-compliance when firms outsource to a service contractor. In this paper, I provide first evidence for non-compliance with temporary agency work regulations when firms contract out on the basis of a unique new firm survey. By exploiting a choice experiment, I demonstrate that firms do understand the regulatory baseline of temporary agency work, although detailed knowledge often seems to be missing. Non-compliance with regulations therefore often results from ignorance of the legal grayzone.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 21-057
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Law
Labor Contracts
Labor Standards: Workers' Rights
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
- Thema
-
temporary agency work
contracting out
compliance
choice experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ganserer, Angelika
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ganserer, Angelika
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2021