Arbeitspapier
The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective
This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1906
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
minimum wage
labor market
employment
unemployment
job offer
job acceptance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Brown, Alessio J. G.
Merkl, Christian
Snower, Dennis J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brown, Alessio J. G.
- Merkl, Christian
- Snower, Dennis J.
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2014