Arbeitspapier

Efficient revenue sharing and upper level governments : theory and application to Germany

Recent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalize fiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditions under which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. A system of redistributive grants among governments is introduced into a standard model of tax competition. This basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in the government objectives at the state level. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policy exploits the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. The results suggest that attempts of state level governments to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharing system exert an upward pressure on tax rates.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1656

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
fiscal equalization
tax competition
fiscal federalism
Germany
Kommunaler Finanzausgleich
Steuerwettbewerb
Finanzföderalismus
Theorie
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Büttner, Thiess
Hauptmeier, Sebastian
Schwager, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Büttner, Thiess
  • Hauptmeier, Sebastian
  • Schwager, Robert
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)