Arbeitspapier
The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
Scientific expertise suggests that mitigating extreme world-wide climate change damages requires avoiding increases in the world mean temperature exceeding 2ê Celsius. To achieve the two degree target, the cumulated global emissions must not exceed some limit, the so-called global carbon budget. In a two-period twocountry general equilibrium model with a finite stock of fossil fuels we compare the cooperative cost-effective policy with the unilateral cost-effective policy of restricting emissions to the global carbon budget. In its simplest form, the cost-effective global policy is shown to consist of a joint emission trading scheme in the first period (only). In sharp contrast, subglobal cost-effective regulation may require the abating country to tax its first-period consumption and to tax or subsidize its emissions in the first and/or second period.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 143-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Thema
-
carbon emissions
carbon budget
cooperative
unilateral
cost-effective regulation
Kohlendioxid
Luftverunreinigung
Klimaschutz
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Kosten-Wirksamkeits-Analyse
Zwei-Länder-Modell
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eichner, Thomas
Pethig, Rüdiger
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
- (wo)
-
Siegen
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eichner, Thomas
- Pethig, Rüdiger
- Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
Entstanden
- 2010
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