Arbeitspapier
International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy
International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy. Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. Given the incentives to free ride, associated to the environment as a public good and to the presence of spillovers, the profitability and the optimality of environmental agreements are separated from their stability (i.e. self-enforcement): hence, a whole set of political economy issues. This paper reviews the recent advances in this area. In particular it discusses mechanisms and strategies aimed at offsetting the incentives to free ride and increasing welfare, such as transfers, issue linkages, threats and multiple agreements. The main results show that partial coalitions and multiple agreements tend to prevail among subsets of players, and that agreements among all players are most unlikely to exist. The design of the agreements, moreover, can be crucial in determining the number of signatory countries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 96.1997
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
Welfare Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
Energy and the Macroeconomy
- Thema
-
Coalitions
International Agreements
Environment
Political Economy
Games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Carraro, Carlo
Siniscalco, Domenico
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1997
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Carraro, Carlo
- Siniscalco, Domenico
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1997
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The structure of international environmental agreements
Designing international climate agreements : an economic analysis of free-riding incentives
Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
Behavioral and distributional effects of environmental policy: Introduction
Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries: Burden-sharing and carbon leakage
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol
Costs, structure and equity of international regimes for climate change mitigation
The Road to Copenhagen: What Agreement Can Actually Be Effective and Stable? by Carlo Carraro
R&D cooperation, innovation spillovers and firm location in a model of environmental policy
Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties
The structure of international environmental agreements
Designing international climate agreements : an economic analysis of free-riding incentives
Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
Behavioral and distributional effects of environmental policy: Introduction
Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries: Burden-sharing and carbon leakage
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol
Costs, structure and equity of international regimes for climate change mitigation
The Road to Copenhagen: What Agreement Can Actually Be Effective and Stable? by Carlo Carraro
R&D cooperation, innovation spillovers and firm location in a model of environmental policy
Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties
The structure of international environmental agreements
Designing international climate agreements : an economic analysis of free-riding incentives
Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
Behavioral and distributional effects of environmental policy: Introduction
Environmental coalitions with heterogeneous countries: Burden-sharing and carbon leakage
Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol
Costs, structure and equity of international regimes for climate change mitigation
The Road to Copenhagen: What Agreement Can Actually Be Effective and Stable? by Carlo Carraro
R&D cooperation, innovation spillovers and firm location in a model of environmental policy