Arbeitspapier
Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs
The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-008/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Cartel stability
trigger strategy
subjective beliefs.
Kartell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hinloopen, Jeroen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hinloopen, Jeroen
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2003
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