Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income, and welfare spending

Arbeitspapier

No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we find that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 36

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
• Thema: Redistribution ; Welfare Spending ; Information ; Income ; Voting ; Political Economics ; Wahlverhalten ; Informationsverhalten ; Einkommen ; Wissen ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Politische Entscheidung ; Öffentliche Sozialausgaben ; USA

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lind, Jo Thori ; Rohner, Dominic
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Department of Economics
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5167/uzh-51540
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77601
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ