Arbeitspapier

Environmental pollution risk and insurance

We consider environmental risks that are evaluated too much heavy for a single insurance company, but they can be insured by n companies which a premium is assigned to.This is precisely the Italian scenario where a pool of companies co-insures these risks.Under a game theoretic approach we start by analyzing how they should split the risk and the premium in order to be better off. Under suitable hypotheses, there exists an optimal decomposition of the risk, that allow us to define a cooperative game whose properties and some particular solutions are analysed.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 87.2002

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Environmental risk
Cooperative game
Umweltbelastung
Risikomodell
Versicherung
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Italien

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fragnelli, Vito
Marina, Maria Erminia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fragnelli, Vito
  • Marina, Maria Erminia
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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