Arbeitspapier
Environmental pollution risk and insurance
We consider environmental risks that are evaluated too much heavy for a single insurance company, but they can be insured by n companies which a premium is assigned to.This is precisely the Italian scenario where a pool of companies co-insures these risks.Under a game theoretic approach we start by analyzing how they should split the risk and the premium in order to be better off. Under suitable hypotheses, there exists an optimal decomposition of the risk, that allow us to define a cooperative game whose properties and some particular solutions are analysed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 87.2002
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Environmental risk
Cooperative game
Umweltbelastung
Risikomodell
Versicherung
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Italien
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fragnelli, Vito
Marina, Maria Erminia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fragnelli, Vito
- Marina, Maria Erminia
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2002
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