Reluctant Privatization

Arbeitspapier

We study the evolution of the control structure of 141 privatized firms from OECD countries over the period from 1996 through 2000. We find that governments do not relinquish control after “privatization.” We show that the market-to-book ratios of privatized firms converge through time to those of a control sample. However, this convergence does not depend on whether governments relinquish their control rights. In fact, large government stakes have no negative effect on either adjusted market value or stock price performance.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 130.2004

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; International Financial Markets ; Business and Securities Law
• Thema: Privatization ; Corporate governance ; Corporate Governance ; Privatisierung ; OECD-Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bortolotti, Bernardo ; Faccio, Mara
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118014
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ