Arbeitspapier

Optimal Income Taxation when Skills and Behavioral Elasticities are Heterogeneous

We solve a large class of multidimensional adverse selection problems with one observed action, to derive the nonlinear optimal income tax schedule when individuals differ along multiple unobserved characteristics. Based on a perturbation of the optimal allocation, our method allows individuals to have e.g. different skills and different taxable income elasticities. Our optimal tax formula generalizes the one with only one-dimensional source of heterogeneity and is numerically implementable. We find that, compared to the case where individuals differ only in skills, allowing them to also have heterogeous taxable income elasticities leads to substantially different optimal tax schedules and in particular, different asymptotic tax rates.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5265

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Subject
optimal taxation
multidimensional screening problems

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Jacquet, Laurence
Lehmann, Etienne
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Jacquet, Laurence
  • Lehmann, Etienne
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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