Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions: Theory and field evidence

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for managers who decide upon promotion. Second, we analyze matched employer-employee survey data with detailed firm level information on managerial incentive schemes and find that perceived promotion quality is indeed substantially higher when managers receive performance-related pay or participate in gain sharing plans.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5543

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Labor Management ; Labor Discrimination
• Thema: incentives ; favoritism ; nepotism ; tournaments ; Erwerbsverlauf ; Personalauswahl ; Führungskräfte ; Patronage ; Leistungsentgelt ; Extensives Spiel ; Theorie ; Feldforschung

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Berger, Johannes ; Herbertz, Claus ; Sliwka, Dirk
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51773
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104133606
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ