Arbeitspapier

Network games with heterogeneous players

We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination and anti-coordination games, varying the strength of action preferences and the size of the linking cost. We find that, despite the symmetry and simplicity of the setting, quite irregular network structures can arise in equilibrium, implying that heterogeneity in players' action preferences may already explain a large part of observed irregularity in endogenously formed networks.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 659

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Noncooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Thema
network games
strategic network formation
preference heterogeneity
efficiency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Orlova, Olena
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(wo)
Bielefeld
(wann)
2021

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29602582
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Orlova, Olena
  • Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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