Arbeitspapier
Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers
We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers fees, each spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a simple institutional setting allowing for joint lawyers in order to overcome this socially inefficient situation. This model is estimated and tested with rich micro-data from court records. Employing a multiple treatment matching procedure we estimate the causal effect of lawyers on the division of matrimonial property, on the length of the divorce process and on the quality of the divorce settlement.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 0713
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Litigation Process
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Family and Personal Law
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
litigation
lawyers
divorce settlements
dispute resolution
family law
multiple treatment matching
Ehe
Rechtsberatung
Excess Burden
Gefangenendilemma
Österreich
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Halla, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Linz
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Halla, Martin
- Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007