Cognitive empathy in conflict situations

Arbeitspapier

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent's preferences is bounded away from zero and one.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 551

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Incomplete Information ; Information Acquisition ; Theory of Mind ; Conflict ; Imperfect Empathy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gauer, Florian ; Kuzmics, Christoph
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (wo): Bielefeld
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149008
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29003860
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ