Arbeitspapier
Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 11/143
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
elections
campaign contributions
interest groups
Wahlkampf
Politikfinanzierung
Interessenpolitik
Gleichgewichtsmodell
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006396483
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2011
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