Arbeitspapier
Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we deal with the question whether and when static conceptslike evolutionary stability can shed any light on what happens in the dynamical context of a population playingthese games. The continuous equivalents of theorems for the finite case are either harder to prove or simplyuntrue. In some cases that fall within the latter category, sensible additional assumptions can repair the damage.Apart from that it turns out that we can no longer ignore the mutation process; with a continuous action space itmakes quite a difference what kind of shocks we consider to be likely.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 01-068/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Theorie
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van Veelen, Matthijs
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van Veelen, Matthijs
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2001
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