Arbeitspapier
Tax competition: greenfield investment versus mergers and acquisitions
In this paper, we analyze tax competition in a model where investor firms have the choice between two types of investment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. We show that the coexistence of these two types of investment intensifies tax competition in comparison to the case where there is only greenfield investment. If a specific tax on acquisitions is available, this result changes. Then, tax competition is mitigated compared to the pure greenfield case. The existence of an acquisition tax may even lead to corporate overtaxation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2247
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Subject
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corporate taxation
mergers and acquisitions
tax competition
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Steuerwettbewerb
Direktinvestition
Übernahme
Fusion
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Becker, Johannes
Fuest, Clemens
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Becker, Johannes
- Fuest, Clemens
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2008