Arbeitspapier

Tax competition: greenfield investment versus mergers and acquisitions

In this paper, we analyze tax competition in a model where investor firms have the choice between two types of investment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. We show that the coexistence of these two types of investment intensifies tax competition in comparison to the case where there is only greenfield investment. If a specific tax on acquisitions is available, this result changes. Then, tax competition is mitigated compared to the pure greenfield case. The existence of an acquisition tax may even lead to corporate overtaxation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2247

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Multinational Firms; International Business
Subject
corporate taxation
mergers and acquisitions
tax competition
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Steuerwettbewerb
Direktinvestition
Übernahme
Fusion
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Becker, Johannes
Fuest, Clemens
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Becker, Johannes
  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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