Arbeitspapier

Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit

A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of retirement beyond early eligibility age. It is often argued that in order to be neutral with respect to individual retirement decisions benefits should be actuarially fair, that is, the present value of additional contributions and benefits ('Delayed Retirement Credit' - DRC) due to postponed retirement should be equal. We show that in a self-selection, asymmetric information model, because individual decisions are suboptimal, the socially optimal benefit structure should be less than actuarially fair.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 889

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
delayed retirement credit
self-selection
moral hazard

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sheshinski, Eytan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
11.03.2025, 20:25 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sheshinski, Eytan
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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