Arbeitspapier
Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit
A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of retirement beyond early eligibility age. It is often argued that in order to be neutral with respect to individual retirement decisions benefits should be actuarially fair, that is, the present value of additional contributions and benefits ('Delayed Retirement Credit' - DRC) due to postponed retirement should be equal. We show that in a self-selection, asymmetric information model, because individual decisions are suboptimal, the socially optimal benefit structure should be less than actuarially fair.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 889
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
delayed retirement credit
self-selection
moral hazard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sheshinski, Eytan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.03.2025, 20:25 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sheshinski, Eytan
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2003