Arbeitspapier
Infrastructure upgrades and foreclosure with coexistence of service-based and facility-based firms
We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding servicebased firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure upgrades made by a regulated facility-based firm on service-based firms play a key role in the incentives for making these upgrades. The spillover effect can enhance the incentives for the regulated facility-based firm to make upgrades if access prices are not regulated. The existence of rival facility-based firms strengthens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to make infrastructure upgrades, especially when the spillover effect is significant. Furthermore, if access prices are not regulated, the existence of rival facility-based firms weakens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to foreclose service-based firms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 860
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
- Thema
-
investment
access
service-based firm
facility-based firm
Investition
Telekommunikationsnetz
Markteintritt
Monopol
Regulierungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Matsushima, Noriaki
Mizuno, Keizo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Matsushima, Noriaki
- Mizuno, Keizo
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2012