Central Bank accountability and transparency: theory and some evidence

Arbeitspapier

The first part of this paper outlines the concept of democratic accountability of central banks, and compares the legal accountability of the ECB with some other central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System). In the second part, we present a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered: transparency of actual monetary policy and the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy. The paper shows that accountability through transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. Accountability through shifting final responsibility in the direction of the government leads to higher inflationary expectations and more stabilization of supply shocks.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2000,06

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Central Banks and Their Policies ; Monetary Policy
• Thema: monetary policy ; central banks ; transparency ; accountability ; Geldpolitik ; Publizitätspflicht ; Zentralbank ; Auskunftspflicht ; Inflationserwartung ; Schätzung ; Theorie ; Kanada ; Japan ; Großbritannien ; USA ; EU-Staaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. ; Hoeberichts, Marco
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsche Bundesbank
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19534
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ