Preprint
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and reciprocity ("gift exchange") in labor relations
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of a non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with reciprocity in labor relations ("gift exchange") a la Danthine and Kurmann (2010), and explicitly perform the aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the deriva- tion of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggre- gate over individual preferences. With a discrete labor supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply increases from unity to infinity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Aggregation
Indivisible Labor
Reciprocity
Non-convexities
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vasilev, Aleksandar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Preprint
Beteiligte
- Vasilev, Aleksandar
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2017
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